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1. Background to SFEM in Nigeria
The high external indebtedness of Nigeria which in 1985 amounted
to more than $17.3 billion! has exerted severe pressure on the nations
debt service burden. The debt service ra tio was approaching the 5)%
mark by 1985 which was considerably above the safe ratio of 10%
recommended by the I. M. F.
The high external ind~btedness resulted from the adverse balance
of payments disequilibria since 1976. The nations foreign exchange
reserves were drawn down to accommodate the high import propensity
of Nigerians which fuelled the deficits in the balance of payments.
The nations foreign exchange reserves continued to plume! as a result
of the over valuation of the naira which gave rise to the high demand
for foreign goods and services in the first place.
In order to reduce the high propensity to import, Nigeria introduced
more comprehensive exchange control measures under the Economio
Stabilization (Emergency Provisions) Aot of 1982. The objective was
to reduce the country's foreign exchange expenditure to a level that
would be compatible with her reduced foreign exchange earning
capacity.
The effect of the world oil glut was also adverse to the fortunes
of member states of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) of which Nigeria is one. This necessitMed cuts in 011 output
in order to firm up oil prices. Since not much could be done in order
to rapidly expand oil receipts in the short run, attention was focussed on
curtailing the out-flow of foreign exchange. To this end, a combination
of monetary and fiscal policy measures were ini~iated by the Federal
Government.
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Some of the measures applicable to the Act of 1982 were strength-
ened in 1983. In 1984, a more stringent excha nge control measure
was promulgated by the Federal Government with a view to revamping
the battered economy through husbanding the nations foreign exchange
resources.
Some of tbe measures embodied in these various acts of government
included reduction in Basic Travelling Allowance (BTA) from naira 800
per individual traveller to naira 100, the prohibition of certain goods
from importation, the placing of goods on specific import license, and
the imposition of compulsory advance deposit for imports.
The compulsory advance depostt for imports wa<; part of exchange
control regulations to curtail imports. The deposits ranging from 25%
to ORM%~ of intended import were aimed at reducing liquidity in the
system as well as reducing the high propensity to import by Nigerians.
The amounts were meant to be deposited in the< Central Bank of
Nigeria by the collecting banks at zero interest rates. These measures
turned out to b~ inadequate in solving Nigeria's balance of payments
problems although marginal surpluses of naira 362 million and naira
561 million were realized in 1984 and 1985 respectively.3
Nigeria until recently was negotiating a loan of naira 2.8 billion
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help defray some of
the outstanding short term obligations of the nation with trade credi-
tors and restore trading relations which had been harmstrung by the
nation'S reduced payments capacity. The I. M. F. did lay down its
usual conditionalities for granting such accommodation. The Nigerian
Government accepted most of the conditionalities at the onset except
three viz: devaluation, trade liberalization and removal of petroleum
subsidy. On the basis. of these conditionalities which were adjudged
severe and against the economic interest of the nation the I. M. F.
package was rejected.
The nation went ahead to implement most of the I.M.F. condition~
alities without taking the loan in an effort to restructure the economy.
The naira continued to depreciate against the weighted basket of seven
key currencies used by the Central Bank to estimate the value of the
naira. Petroleum subsidy was reduced by about 80%, above the phased
withdrawal ~rlier agreed with the I. M. F. The problems of the
nation persisted viz: ~xcess demand of for~ign good,> and services,
inability to service due debts, and cessation of credit lines by trade
~reditorsK Goods could no longer flow as before,
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It wa:; necessary to reschedule Nigeria's outstanding debt obligations
in order to reduce her debt service burden to rna nageable proportions.
The Gov:rnment was ready for a burden of not more than PM;~ of
export earnings, but to discharge Nigeria's outstanding obligations
would require much more than 50 f~ of current export earnings.
Also both the London Club and Paris Club of Bank Creditor.> and
Export Credit Agencies respeclivdy would require a stabilization pro-
gramme wilh I. M. F. in order to agree to debt rescheduling. This is
because the approval and concordance of I. M. F. is always necessary
in such negotiations. The Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market was
conceived as an alternative strategy to meet with all outstanding I.M.F.
conditionalities al'ld thus qualify for debt rescheduling under 1. M. Fo's
enhanced surveillance scheme.
The S. F. E. M. apart from qualifying Nigeria for debt reschedul-
ing also has the following objectives :~
(i) To achiev~ the convertibility of the naira.
(ii) To elimipate ,the illegal traffic in curr~ncy and goods across
the country's borden.
(iii) To em~linrate the economic problems based on adverse
balar.ce of payments and the distortions introduced by the
import licen;ing machinery which enricl:ed some undeserving
bUiinessmen at the expeme of the nation'S interest.
(iv) To provide the mechanism for dealings in foreign exchange
at marKet determined rates and ultimately achi~ve simple
equilibrium rate for the naira.
(v) To achieve optimal allocation of resources.
(vi) To attract in-flow of capital, especially funds held abroad
.by Nigerians.
(vii) To enable Nigeria compet~ effectively with other financial
centres for funds to finance industrial growth and develop-
ment.
In the foregoing it would be shown that SFEM i( properly
implemented would meet with the above objectives.
2. The Meaning of the SFEM
Since the naira cannot float effectively as a result of its non-
convertibility and non-trading status, an alternative is to ,create a
second tier exchange window where the true valu.: of the naira can
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emerge by the demand and supply of foreign currency i:l the market.
For instance, if naira 5 billion constitutes effective d~mand for foreign
currency and S 2 billion is the supply of specific foreign curren.;y, th~n
the exchange valu,; for naira and dollars would b,; 2.5 to I. pinc~
.11aira h assumed overvalued before the regime of th,; SFEM, the true
value of the "aira would emerge in the market by th,; demand and
supply of foreign ex,change which i~ the same thing as the supply and
the demand for the naira.
The supply of foreign exchange comes through the export of goods
and services, through loans and investments, through inward unilateral
transfers and t!l~ export of gold. a~mand for foreign exchange comes
through imports of goods and services, through loam and investments
made abroad, outward uliilateraltransfers and the import of monetary
gold. In the Nigerian context, the bulk of the foreign exchange supply
comes from the export of oil which traditionally has been responsible
for over 90% of Nigeria's foreign receipts. The import of goods and
services is the largest absorber of foreign exchange.
Foreign cxcha'1ge is bought and sold in organi,ed markets which
are foreign exchange departments of comm~rcialand m~rchant banks,
the authorised deaL:rs in foreign currencies. They sell for ;ign excha ~ge
in any curre:".cy desired by a cu.tomer and purchase any foreign ex-
change offered to them. Purchases and sales ar~ at sp::cilbd pric~s
which are determi:1ed in the weekly auctio:1 conducted by the Central
Bank for the participating deakrs.
For Ihis purpose the participating dt:,akrs meet every thur"day
morniog to bid for· specific allotm:nts of foreign exchange. The amount· ..
that each dealer bids for h limited by operating Central BanI( guidc~
lines.· The market· clearil)g price or the' marginal rale at which the
weekly supply of foreign exchange is completely exhau :ted is given as
the marKet determined pric~· for foreign exchange to be used for the
subsequent trading w~ekK
If the supply of foreign exchange is how, the naira exchange rate
will be high, that is more naira will exchange for a unit of for~igo
currency. Jf the supply is high r.:lative to d~mandI then the a·,nount of
depreciation of the naira in terms of foreign currency will be less.
Thus if the market is not well funded with adequate supply of fordgn
exchange, the exchange rate would escalate to the disadvantage of
kig~ria with implicatiou> of soaring high prices of foreign produced
go<;>ds as. a result of their very high naira impart costs. To mitigat~ a
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potential inflationary pressure adequate funding for the market must
have to be found.
Foreign exchange estimates fOI" 1986 showed that crude oil exports
would provide 8 billion, while nOll-oil exports would provide additional
$ I billion. These estimates were based on a daily production of 1.1
million barrels of oil per day (mbd) , sold at a price of $ 20 pe,r barrel.
Oil prices have since dropped sharply and the country is producing 1.4
mbd and exporting 1.2 mbd. U,ing an envisaged price of SlOper
barrel total oil earnings for 1936 would come to $ 4.380 billion. This
added to exp~cted non-oil earnings of about S 800 million wo'uld give a
total foreign exchange earnings of $ 5.18 billion for 19865 •
Based on these estimates about $100 million would b~ available
foreign exchange on a week by week basis for 1986 and probably for
1987 as welt After deducting 30% debt servicing requirements, an
average of $70 million would b~ available from official SOurces for
auctioning on a weekly ba3is. Other sources which might boost this
figure marginally are the domicilliary accounts and the world bank
loan.
All transactions except repayment of external debts and subscrip-
tions to international organisations will b~ dealt with iil th~ SFEM.
Apnrt from normal imports there are arrears of payments whose repay-
ment will exert a gr~at pressure on th~ market. The.;e arrears could
have b~en dischargoo with an I. M. F. loan, sincv they are short-term
obligations, they are not subject to rescheduling arrangem«nts. It is
unlikely that after setting aside about 30% of each year3 earnings the
SFEM would have sufficient supply with which to work effectivcly6.
Supply from the world ba:lk and the domicilliary ace,>UGt could be a
potent source to stabilise the mark\.Jt and reduce potential inflationary
, . I
pressure.
The SFEM if left uncontrolled would reali~e the true value of the
naira. The applicable con troIs through Central Bank Guidelines
should be directed in achieving economic efficiency in realisi g the trUJ
value of thJ naira. Among the potential bJnetits is tha t the Govern-
m~nt would get much enharlc~d revenue from oil exports. The revenue
to Government depcnding on the amount of devaluation of the naira,
would b~ a muldple of earlier figures. Exporter& would havq a boom
because of the favourable exchange rate: for their foreign earnil1gs and
tbis would be added incentive, to increased production for exports and
increas~d foreign exchange proce~dsK The economy would be restruc-
tured to produce more goods and services otht:r than oil, since th.e
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price incentives for this would work in the right direction. The high
profit take home by middlemen who purchased good~ at official rates
and sold at prices dictated by black market conditions would be
eff:::ctively check-mated. Black market transactions, smuggling, traffi~
eking in currwcie~·and oth~r untoward practices like over-invoicing of
imports .and under-invoicing of exports through which Nigeria lost
about naira 15 billion in four years (1979-1983) would be effectively
,controlled to the economic benefit of the nation.
3. Case for Naira DepreciatioD
Prior to the SFEM the Nig<:rian naira was overvalued and this
contributed a great deal to the d~ficits in her balaoc~ of payments and
the building up of lh~ high external d ~btsK An overvalued currency
makes imporis ('heaper and exports more exp~f1Rin thereby i'lcreasing
the propensity to import. Import control m~asure; are inadequate
since they do not control the desig to trade. but only make it more
difficult thereby creating exce~s demand or shortages which in turn
drives consumers to the black market~K7 Naira depreciation .would
reduc: the, demand for foreign produced goods by increa~ing the cost
of such goods and also increase exports by reducing the price of
domestic export goods. According to Alfred Mar3hall and Abba P,
Lerr.er Elh~ Marshall-i~rner Conditioil),8 devaluatio;l (or exchange
depreciation) would improve trad~ balance if the sum of price elasti-
cities of a country's exports and imports exceed unity.
The "e~asticities pessimism" which ensued as a result of the
practical difficulties til attaining the required magnitude of elasticities
to achieve the de'ired result is irrdevant to the kig~rian situation. In
Nigeria, the demand elasticiti~s for imports are high and the supply
response i3 strong. For most d:.veloping countri~s it was shown that
the demand elasticities and supply response were weak validating the
earlier pessimism.s
Naira depreciation would thus achieve the desired effect by the
following gains in foreign currency:
(a) By making import competing goods b:.come relatively
cheaper compared with imports, the marginal propensity to
import goods goes down. Nigeria would therefore save an
amcunt in foreign currency equal to the increase in turn-
over in the home market. The imbalance in the external
account would be corrected partly from Dsaving~ accruing
from this source.
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(b) Nigeria would ch~apen her export goods and b:come mOre
competitive with naira depreciation. Fordgn exchange is
gained at the expense of other comp~ting countries. Thi,
can also help in correcting external imbalanc~K
The Central Bank of Nigeria was entrusted with the re:>pon,ibiiity
of managing th~ nations external reserve;. One asp::ct of it involves
the determination of the naira exchange rate. This is ba<ed mostly on
the curre!lcies of Nigeria's major trading partners. the Central Bank's
import weig ted ba"ket of currenci~sK The currenci~s comprise the
U. S. dollar, the pound sterling, the deutschmark, the Japanese y.m,
the French franc, the Swiss fanc, and the Dutch guilder.
Befor~ 1978, the Central Bank of Nigeria h~ld its reerve assets
only in the Bank of E'1gland and th:: ced~ral Reserve Bank of k~w
York in the U. S. As a result th:J naira exchange rat~ was tied to
movements in th~ U. S. dollar and the Britiih pound s!erling in the
international money market. Since 1978, a ba;bt of curr~ncies
approach similar to the 1. M. F. sy3tem of valuation of ,the Special
Drawing Rights (SDR'i) has be~n in u,e in the determinatiO:l of the
exchange value of the naira. Like the SDRs this involve'> ,the Central
Bank monitoring of the movement of the exchang~ value; of the
currencies of all Nigeria's major trading partner; daily, the seven
currencies earlier mentioned. Based on these, the Central Bank of
Nigeria estimates the naira exchange rate on a day to day basis.
Since naira is not a convertible or trading currency, its va lue with
respect to other currencies cannot be determined by its supply and
demand in the international mo ney market.1o This is b:caU>e there i,
no direct demand for naira as such to pay for goods imported from
Nigeria a ithough there are corresponding supplie, of foreign currency.
The correct value of the naira can only be determined if there is orga-
nised trading in naira currency vis-a-vis other currencies. Thi, innova-
tion in the recent creation of the 2nd tier foreign exchang~ market
(SFEM) in Nigeria assures c0ntinuous determination of the exchange
value of the naira on a we~k by week basis througll the demand and
supply of fl)reign currency and the supply and demand for the naira.
Prior to this innovation, the method of estimation by the Central Bank
of Nigeria tended to over-value the naira currency. For instance, the
black market rate for the naira in terms of other foreign currencies is
considerably higher than official ra tes.
This overvaluation tended to put premium on imports which were
cheaper and to discount exports which were relativ~ly expensive.
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With naira d~preKciationI exports from Nigeria would b~ chcap:r and
import~ more expense. A positive shift in exports of goods and servic~s
would earn more foreign exchange to correct the imbalance in th~
balance of payments and payoff outstanding debts. Also a reduction
in imports by the high cmt of imported items would create additional
savings in foreign exchange.
4. Operation of the SFEM
SFEM has css':lntially three components:
(i) CBN organised tcnder sessiom,
(ii) Inter bank dealings and
(iii) Over the counter dealings b~tween banks and their custom~rsK
Once a week on thursday morning, a price fixing session is con-
ducted by the Central Bank with the participation of authorized dealers
who are mostly comm<::rcial and merchant banks. These dealers bid for
foreign exchange held by th~m in excess of their working balances and
foreig'1 exchange supplied by the Central Bank. The exchange rate
fixed by this bidding process is used in the subsequ~nt week to value
imports and exports and for payment of the relevant duties and taxes.
All appointed dealers display in a conspicuous place in their offices
quota tions of their buying and selling ratefor various foreign currencies.
These rate,s are communicated to the Central Bank on a daily basis.
They apply to all transactions up to $5,000 or the equivalent foreign
currency. Rates for amount above $5,000 would be subject to negotia-
tion beh....een the banks and their customers with the proviso that the
striking rate should be within the one percent band of variation on tbe
Central rate for the week.
Any prospective buyer or seller would approach his bank. If a
buyer, he has to furnish documentary evidence of the underlying service
or commercial transaction. All deakrs would satisfy themselves that
the requisite documents are furnished. Also files for each transaction
with tbe relevant documents are required of banks to b~ produced for
verification by Central Bank field inspectors.
In the interbank market, comm~rcial banks, merchant banks and
other foreign exchange dealers are free to buy and sell foreign exchange
amongst th~m;elvesK These tramactions are at mutually agreed rates
and could be in spot or forward contracts. Penalties for non-delivery
a t specified dates including loss of deakrship licenses are all articulated
in the operating Central Bank Guidelines.
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Foreign exchange earnings of the non~oi1 private sector may be
held or sold Lo any commercial bank, merchant bank or appointed
foreign cxcha;;ge'dealer. Thus mandatory surrender requirement for
private sector foreign exchange earnings was abolished, but a 9.5%
exchange levy on all foreign exchange transactions is still payable to
the Central Bank. Specified dates for delivery with penalties for non-
compliance were also articulated in the Guidelines.
The price which buyers would want to pay for one U. S. dollar for
instance would depend on both the relative weight of demand for the
dollar and the quantity of doUar available for sale. On September 26,
1986 the first price fixing sessiOn was held. While the supply of fordgn
exchange was fixed at $50 million, the total demand was $71,77 million
and the successful bid rate was naira 4.6 to $1. In the second price
fixing session on October 2. 1986, the supply of foreign exchange was
fixed at $50 million and the demand rose to $77.11 million with the
successful bid rate shooting up to n..ira 5.1 to $1. This is in agreement
with the law of wpply and demand,u The increased demand in the
2nd price fixing session with a given supply. pushed up the naira price
of the dollar.
Q
quantity of foreign currency
Fig. I. Change in demand and exchange rate.
As shown in Fig. 1. ahove, the increa!>ed demand for dollars in
the O~d week pu~hed up the naira price of the dollar. The sup I is
fixed In both periods at $50 million. P Y
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In the third week of trading the foreign exchange supplied increased
to $75 million and the total demand was $75.5 million. The effective
exchange ra te came down to naira 3.4999 to one dollar. The increased
supply al:d r~duccd demand ,"orked to reduce the naira price of the
doUar. The reduced demar;d pU5hed down th~ curve in Fig. 1 and the
increased supply shifted right-wards the vertical ·supply curve for an
intersection at a lower naira price.
The first column in table I is the code number of the bank/dealer.
The second column is the dealers bid rate, Le. the nurr,ber of naira he
is willing to exchange for one dollar. The tbird column is the bid
amount, which is the amount of dollars the bank is bidding to buy for
its weekly transactions. The fourth column is the cumulative total of
foreign currency demand by the bank,>. A, shown the grand cumulatin
total demal~d for the week was $75.525 million dollars which wa'> just
marginally higher than the supply. Thus the exchang~ rate of
naira 3.51$ for the week was described as the most realistic so far sinc~
the demaD~d and the supply for foreign currency w;:re about equal.
Thus the long run value of the naira would tend to gravitate to this
level. The naira 3.51$ exchange rat~ was arrived at when the w;:ekly
foreign exchange supply of $75 million wa<;exhausted by the marginal
bidder bank XOY in table I below.
At the fourth bidding session on lctob~r 16, 1986 th~ naira rate
of exchange depreciated marginally to naira 3.910/$. This represented a
drop of 10.5% from the earlier Parity of naira 3.4999/$. This was
caused by a higher demand than the increased supply of foreign
exchange at the fourth bidding session. While the supply increased by
6.7% ($75 million to $80 million), the total demand rose by 23.9%
($75.53 million to 93.55 million). The greater increase in demand
served to pull up the marginal rate from its earlier parity of naira
3.5/S to naira 3. 9101/$. Thus the marginal ratc pricing us;:d seem to
conform to economic rationality. The different cross rate.s of exchange
with the seven basket of currencies normally used by the Centra I Bank
are as shown in table U.
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Table 1
3RD BIt:'DINOS AT 9/10·86
Code No. Bid 1{ate Bid Amount Cumulative 'fotal
BOC 5.3499 0.75 million 0.75 million
105 5.1000 2.25 3.00 >,
COB 5.002 1.00 ,. 4.00
'>MAA 4.9575 3.75 >. 7.75
"
ABT 4.9545 0.50
"
8.50 ..
BCO 4.9525 2.25
"
10.50
DBS 4.9525 2.25
"
12.75 ..
FAE 4.8750 L25 .. 15.00 ..
JLX 4.8499 2.25 .. 17.25 ,-
FOD 4.8050 1.85 ,> 19.10
EAA 4.8015 2.25 .. 21.35 ,.
JOO 4.8000 1.50
"
22.85 ..
DBB 4.7749 2.25
"
25.10 ..
ODD 4.7611 2.25 ., 27.35
"EXT 4.6025 2.25
"
O~KSM
"DFA 4.5109 2.25 .. 31.85 ..
PON 4.5100 2.25 .. 34.10 .,
BOD 4.5000 2.25
"
36.35
"MKO 4.4999 2.25
'> 38.60 -,
MME 4.4590 2.25 40.85
"lAA 4.4584 2.25
-, 43.10
"LAA 4.4111 2.25
"
45.35
"SAA 4.3500 0.35
"
45.70
'J
Xyy 4.3125 2.25
"
47.95 >.
RDA 4.2645 2.25
"
50.20
CNN 4.2518 0.55
"
50.75
"AKA 4.2278 2.25
"
53.00
"TXL 4.2125 2.25
"
55.25
OeD 4.2015 1.70
"
56.95
-,
JOE 4.1315 2.25
"
59.20 >,
ALO 4.1050 2.25
"
61.425
"JOS 4.0221 2.25 .. 63.675
"MAR 3.9995 3.75
"
67.425
"JAY 3.9800 2.025
"
49.45
"JAS 2.8672 3.75
"
73.20
"~lv 3.4999 2.2
"
75.40
COK 3.2501 0.1 t, 75.50 ..
NMA 2.7052 0.025
"
75.525
"
SOllrce : Central Bank of Nigeria.
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Currencies
U. S. Dollar
Pound sterling
Deutsche Mark
Swiss Franc
French Franc
Dutch duild~r
Japanese yen
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Table II
CR05S RATES OF EXCHANGE
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 te~·k 4
4.6174 5.0339 3.499} 3.9101
6.6269 7.3462 4.9751 5.6305
2.2578 2.5180 1.7517 1.9807
2.7840 3.1056 2.1492 2.4915
0.6900 0.7688 0.5353 0.6043
1.9972 2.2278 1.5503 1.5134
0.0299 0.0330 0.0227 0.0253
Source : Central Bank of Nfgeria.
Ihc subsequent reductions in demand after the 2nd bidding session
was du~ to revised guidelines brought out by the Central Bank. Ear-
lier banks were allowed to bid for up to 10% of total funds available.
In the revised guid~lines it was stated that "awards of successful bids
to any on~ dealer would not be more than five percent of total foreign
exchange available at the weeKly tender in respect of the Central Bank,
First Bank. Union Bank, and the United Bank of Africa while awards
of successful bids in respect of all other banks would not b:: more than
3 percent"u. Thus the reduction of th:: proportion of bid amounts
served to reduce cumulative demands and to maKe foreign exchange
available to more banks. For imtaOlce in the second bid session only
13 banks were successful. but i'1 the third bid session with the revised
guidelines in operation, 36 banks made successful bids.
Also the fail in the naira price of the dollar at the 3rd bid session
was due to the pricing method adopted with the revised guidelines. The
first two price sessions used what was called average of successful bid
prices. That is all successful bids were averaged to get the price for the
week. This is no price at all and makes no eCO:lom;c s~nseK The revised
guidelines started that "contracts would be awarded to the highest bids
and lowest sales orders worKing down the list until the weeks allocalion
and dealers sales are e.xhausted. In the event tha t volume of bids at
the marginal rate (the lowest successful bid rate) is more than could be
accommodated witbin that week's allocation, all the bids at the marginal
rate would b;: awarded on pro rata basis".u
Thus the pricing system changed from average successful bid prices
to marginal rate prices. The mariinal rate is the pric~ that exhausts
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the supply for the week. This is the market clearing price. Dealers
are willing to pay higher, but what they actually pay, which is the
pric~ for the week is the marginal rate that clears the market. 'thus
dealers benefit from consumer's surplus which is the difference between
what they actually pay and what they are willing to pay. To use the
Dutch auction method whereby dealers buy at bids quoted would be
disintegrative. It would not allow the emergence of a single price
representing the value of the naira. One of the objectives of SFEM is
to allow the emergence of the true value of the naira.
5. Recommendations and Conclusions
The SFEM'has e,ffected considerable depreciation of the naira cur-
rency. The pre SFEM naira/dollar parity was Naira 1.21/$14. but after the
first week of trading this rose to Naira 4.5/$ a depreciatioll of over 280
percent. In the second week of trading the amount of depreciation
effected Oil pre SFEM parity rose to ab;Jut 322 percent. This confirms
the fact of the over valuation of the naira prior to SFEM.
The considerable depreciation of the naira would achieve the, objec~
tive of SFEM. It would lead 10 increased domestic production, increased
exports and reduced imports. It would checkmate the high incidence
of adverse balance of payments and burgeoning external indebtedness.
Thus if properly handled the econom, could be restructured and
diversified to withstand the vicissitude.> from the external sector
resulting from ineffective demand for Nigeria's mono product,
oil. The untoward practices that led to a drain of Nigeria'S foreign
exchange like over-invoicing of imports, under-invoicing of exports,
smuggling and naira trafficking would be abated ar.d with these would
come the demise or near so of the black marKet which earlier was funded
b~ these perverse practices.
For a proper functioning of the system the market should be well
funded to moderate the resulting naira price of foreign currency. Low
funding will exacerbate the potential inflationary consequences of
SFEM. A very high naira price of foreign currency will result in a
very high naira price of foreign produced goods which would Worsen
the inflationary spiral in the economy. The funding should come
through Nigeria's traditional export earnings, the domicilinary account,
earnings to Government from oil exports and also loans from multi.
lateral sources ego I.M.F. and IBRD. No source should be rejected
bxaus~ of earlier committments to Nigerians for instance the committ-
m~nt not to contract 1. M. F. loan. Such committments make no sense
sinc~ all 1. M. F. conditionalitie have been over-fulfilled.
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Prices are no doubt going to rise due to the increased naira/foreign
,currency rate al~d the increased money supply consequent on the mone-
tisation of the foreign exchange proceeds. This tendency would be
moderated by the increased productivity which SFEM would unleash so
that the final impact effect of prices would not be the exact magnitude
as dictated by the increased exchange rate. Further in the past trad..:;rs
who used official exchange rates to import goods have sold them at Prices
dictated by the black market exchange rates which are higher than the
present SFEM rates. The traders and middlemen thus earned supernor-
mal profits. These supernormal profits would be effectively re·duced
and prices do not necessarily have to rise as high as the new SEEM
rates would suggest.
Since the marginal rate pricing used in the price fixing sessions
comply with economic rationality, it's use should be continued in all
future auctions. The alternative dutch auction which implies a penalty
for high bidders since they would be compelled to buy at their bid
rat~s and sell at the marginal rate, would portray the Government as
a perfectly discriminating monopolist only interested in maximizing
its revenue ard not in establishing a stable exchange rate. The dutch
auction would lead to different rates for ditIercnt banks and this
could give rise to secondary speculative transactions that would not
()()nduce to stability. The marginal rate pricing conformed to economic
rationality because as demand increased at given supply, the eltchange
rale rose; and as demand fell with increased supply, the exchange rate
fell. Thus3 there was no tendency for the market to artificially leave
prices high as speculated by some commentators. The marginal rate
pricing thus conformed to efficbnt market hypothesis. The important
cosideration is for the true value of the naira to emerge. Further in
subsequcJlt trading sessions the difference b~tween the highest and -
lowest bids narrowed showing tbat dealers are acqui~ing expertise in cor-
rect bidding.
For effective planning and to attract investments, a stable exchage
rate is preferable to floating and variable rates. So it is recommended
that after tt year of trading the loan run equilibrium price of the naira
should be stabilised and held for one year and allowed to vary by narrow
margins within a lower and upperinterv~ntion point by the Central
Bank. Year by year changes of the central rate instead of weedkly
variations should be entertained henceforth because variable rat~s incre-
ase instability and introduce high risk elem:mts in international capital
flows.
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It is also recommended that public sector wages be updated by a
reasonable percentage escalator. If not, fixed income r~~ivers in the
public sector would continue to suffer as a result of stagnant incomes
at the face of gradually rising price, which have continued for over a
decade nowY> The funds for such salary review wonld b~ available
given the increllsed revenue prospects for the Government as foreign
exchange is monetised at very favourable exchange rates. A 100%
change in wages could effect only a 10% increment in prices. Wages
have increased, but everybody is better off because of induced changes
in productivity.lll
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